

Table of Contents

ACRONYMS	ii
PREFACE	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
POINTERS TO POLICY TRAJECTORY.....	5
INTRODUCTION	9
RATIONALE.....	11
METHODOLOGY	11
IMPORTANT UNCERTAINTIES.....	14
THE SCENARIOS	15
SCENARIO ONE: BEST-CASE SCENARIO	16
FUTURE HISTORY	17
THE SITUATION IN 2025	19
POLICY LESSONS FOR THE BEST-CASE SCENARIO	21
SCENARIO TWO: STATUS QUO	22
A FUTURE HISTORY.....	23
THE SITUATION IN 2025	25
POLICY LESSONS FOR THE STATUS QUO	28
SCENARIO THREE: DICTATORSHIP	30
A FUTURE HISTORY.....	31
THE SITUATION IN 2025	32
POLICY LESSONS FOR DICTATORSHIP SCENARIO.....	34
SCENARIO FOUR: RESUMPTION OF WAR	35
A FUTURE HISTORY.....	36
THE SITUATION IN 2025	37
POLICY LESSONS FOR RESUMPTION OF WAR SCENARIO.....	38
REFLECTIONS ON THE SCENARIOS.....	39
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SOUTH SUDANESE GOVERNMENT AND PARTIES.....	42
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR (INTER) NATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	45
CONCLUSIONS	46

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CRA	Compensation and Reparation Authority
CCNP	Concern Citizen Network for Peace
CPA-2005	Comprehensive Peace Agreement-2005
HLRF	High Level Revitalization Forum
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
LRC	Law Review Commission
NCAC	National Constitution Amendment Committee
ODK	Online Data Kit
PFM-RP	Public Finance Management and Reform Process
R-ARCSS	Revitalized Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in Republic of South Sudan, 2018
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SPLM-IG	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – In Government
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement – In Opposition
SDSR- Board	Strategic Defense Security Review Board
THRC	Truth Healing and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

Preface

This document has been developed by, members of the Concern Citizens Network for Peace (CCNP). Which is a voluntary network comprising of South Sudanese from different walks of life. Through support of the national consultant process benefit from perspectives gathered from workshops, focus group discussions, and one-on-one interviews with opinion leaders and key South Sudanese and foreign nationals who have been keen on following South Sudan's peace and stability processes for couple of years.

Since 2016, CCNP has been keen on following national trajectory in peace, security and stability. The group has developed "Scenarios for South Sudan in 2020" followed by a midterm review on the same – "Monitoring Scenarios for South Sudan in 2020". The projections in these two documents proved the need to undertake another process of developing Scenarios for South Sudan in 2025.

The scenarios in this document was developed based on inspiration from the lessons of the two documents mentioned above, outcome of the conversations during the consultations with different stakeholders, actors and opinion leaders in the country. The discussion sessions focused on different themes such as governance, security, economy, strategic thinking, domestic and foreign policies.

The entire process of developing scenarios for South Sudan in 2025 benefited from insights of those who spared time to share their thoughts and understandings of the country dynamics and specific themes analyzed during the consultation process by members CCNP and PAX for Peace. Collectively, it's sincere hope of the CCNP members, and that of PAX that this report provides the necessary analysis and though provoking perspectives in the four scenarios to generate constructive discourse that will shape the future trajectory of South Sudan.

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Executive Summary

While the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was a major step towards restoration of peace and stability in South Sudan, its selective and intermittent implementation poses a threat to the country and predisposes the nation to several uncertainties. With continued internal divisions among the parties to R-ARCSS and trust deficit witnessed among the top leadership, future stability for the country still remains as a far fetch dream. Clearly, full implementation of the R-ARCSS is far from reality with insufficient “political will” demonstrated by the parties, major aspects of R-ARCSS such as unification of the army and other reform and transformation agenda taking excessive long to implement.

The pattern of the implementation of R-ARCSS seem only known to few people within the top level of national governance and in some cases the presidency and few national ministers. The rest of the nation is left wallow in dilemma. With the St. Egidio mediated process in Rome experiencing major setback, the number of uncertainties faced by the country continue to grow. In this kind of environment, where the country stands, it's prudent for the national leadership, political, non-political and international/develop partners to make deliberate efforts in building possible scenarios as means of forecasting future history of the country and to provide recommendations to avert further upheaval.

The Scenarios described in this document therefore, are an attempt to forecast the future outlook of the country considering that the five (5) key uncertainties outlined in this document maintain prominence in impacting the future history of the country in all the four scenarios discussed in subsequent sections of the document.

Key uncertainties

1. Who thinks and plans for South Sudan and how? Would a central planning entity serve as the much-needed catalyst to synchronize development priorities to citizens' needs, aspirations to set the country on motion to development and stability?
2. Will the Holdout groups and R-TGoNU sign an agreement at the end of the St. Egidio mediated peace process in Rome considering major setbacks the process has been experiencing? Are the political leaders bothered to building constituencies, relate to the masses and genuinely foster peace or are simply detached and lobby for appointments in higher positions for personal gains?
3. Will South Sudan hold elections by 2023 or at any interval within the time horizon of 2025, how will the elections be organized? Can the current legislature and executive facilitate the much-anticipated reforms? Political parties in the country seem to heavily revolve around individuals rather than stand as institutions; What will happen in the event any of the current party leaders happen to exit the political scene without prior notice?
4. Will South Sudanese women, youth, persons with disabilities and communities at local levels effectively demand accountability? What structures exist among communities to help facilitate organized demand for social accountability?
5. What does the country need to maintain all existing embassies and sizeable workforce in the public service? What is the country's GDP and total debt burden? What is the national security objective, foreign and domestic policy of the country? Is the government ready to genuinely implement the security sector reform?

Snapshot of the four Scenarios

These scenarios are developed based on an analysis of the country context in light of the five (5) key uncertainties mentioned above and other important uncertainties which are outlined in the subsequent sections of this document. The scenarios should not be misunderstood as a prediction of the country's future. But rather a forecast of what the future would look like, if concrete actions are not taken to redefine the future of the country. Therefore, the recommendations and the lessons provided are to enable different actors and stakeholders to exert efforts to avert drifting into the last two scenarios.

Best Case Scenario: A peaceful country after successful implementation of all reform and transformation programmes outlined in R-ARCSS, negotiation with Holdout groups through the St. Egidio mediation efforts leads to signing of truce, and establishment of systems that facilitate good governance – transparency and accountability, inclusion, equity and equality, embrace unity in diversity and ethnic equality. National priorities are aligned to the needs and aspirations of citizens, politically instigated inter and intra communal violence significantly minimize. Security situation largely improved, the country provides clear vision for national development, peace and stability, culture of consensus and sufficient political will stimulated to pull the country out of instability and under development.

Status Quo: Many uncertainties, selective implementation of R-ARCSS, latent friction among the parties with top leadership of the country seemingly working in collaboration and ostensibly trying to implement reform and transformation agenda of R-ARCSS. However, this is done in accordance with their own vision. Institutions of the executive distributed in accordance with the responsibility shared formula provided for in R-ARCSS with seemingly blurred lines of inter-agency cooperation. Progress in each institution predominantly depends on vision of the head of institution. But most importantly how proactive and strategically the head of a particular institution is positioned within the politics of the country. Slight efforts being made to put up with the quest for aligning state priorities to citizen's needs/aspirations, fear and intimidation prevalent among civilians and other government officials. The center seems to be shrinking and focusing more on national affairs with diminishing impact on periphery. Judiciary and Legislature seem to be less prominent as executive overlaps their role. National economy clearly stagnant, unstable and continue to be weakened. Tribalism and conflict over resources, inter and intra-communal conflict continue to engulf the country. Holdout groups and insecurity still pose threat to the nation while most citizens are disillusioned.

Dictatorship: Selective or aborted implementation of the reform and transformation agenda initiated by R-ARCSS. Parliament is unable to provide space for the members to equally and freely participate and play the oversight role, freedom of speech, freedom of association and other liberties curtailed and inhibited. More repressive laws enacted. Widespread fear and intimidation used against ordinary citizens and other government officials. Members of executive, legislature and judiciary are not exempted. The center exercise strong grip on almost every affair of the nation but significantly shrinking influence on periphery. Eventually elections conducted with most political parties unable to take part, other locations due to logistic and security challenges end up not participating in the elections. The current parties to R-ARCSS fizzle out and more dominant party buy off members from the other parties. Eventually the opposition voices silenced. and the country remains under single party rule. The territorial integrity threatened as the neighboring states passively encroaching, national economy crumbled, freedoms and civil liberties excessively inhibited.

Resumption of War: Full-fledged disagreement among the parties to the agreement, elections results clearly not credible. Other groups blocked out from participating in the national government possibly through detentions, the army still not united, each political groups falls back to their military grouping to declare war against the center. Civilians find themselves again helpless and follow any group they happen to be trapped with, not necessarily out of choice but rather out of fear. Some international humanitarian agencies evacuate their staff due to insecurity. Institutions of governance weakened, the central government shrink and only to maintain presence in the capital. Growing mistrust among actors within the central government. Tribalism, conflict over resources, inter and intra-communal conflict engulf the country. Holdout groups and other emerging groups take control of other parts of the country. Neighboring states continue to encroach various territories of South Sudan and citizens shift allegiance to those states due to the fact that they provide services in those locations. The country risks possibility of becoming a dysfunctional state and lose membership in regional and international blocs.

Pointers to Policy Trajectory

Governance

1. R-ARCSS presents opportunity for redirecting national trajectory toward best-case scenario if reform and transformation agenda is mainstreamed, necessary political will demonstrated and genuinely implemented.
2. Many are convinced that R-ARCSS brought a semblance of peace and cessation of hostilities to most parts of the country. This could provide room for security sector reform and transformation. However, deliberate effort and political-will to work for real peace with continuous consensus building among the parties remain farfetched.
3. Though unique, the St. Egidio mediated Rome process is to a large extent similar to the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), where the interest of political elite is in the center of the process. Therefore, the product is likely to be reflective of interest of the politicians and power sharing process. There is more to be done to mainstream interest of the masses in process to ensure that the holdout groups bring in new positive perspective.
4. The current Parliament with its immense capacity challenges and the big number may have unpredictable impact in facilitating reform and transformation. However, there lies opportunity in the work done by mechanisms especially the National Constitution Amendment Committee (NCAC), possibility of reviving the Law Review Commission (LRC) and support through civil society organizations and development partners to complement efforts being made to strengthen institutions, systems and realize reform through legislative processes.
5. Based on the R-ARCSS model, formation of executive is based on party representations, which predominantly focuses on accommodation than constituting a team to implement specific policies. This largely ignores merit and place destiny of each institution to luck and hopefully the political interest provides a competent candidate.
6. R-ARCSS clearly recognizes the need for South Sudan to decide on a system of governance that responds to the context of the country. However, this requires specific preparation and achievement of particular milestones to facilitate popular participation. However, processes such as constitution making and elections have taken long to progress.

Security (State and Human Security)

1. The concept of national security in South Sudan does need to include human security for every citizen. Currently, it seems more about state security and protection of senior political leaders. More is yet to be seen in terms of wider analysis of national vulnerability, protection of territorial integrity and manning the porous borders that may indicate potential conflict or threat to peaceful coexistence with the neighboring states.
2. Security sector in the country to large extent is marred with rampant abuse of power and misconduct. The benefits of the CPA-2005 experience seem not well utilized and citizens are made to believe that they have no role to ensure security as a common good.
3. The current team seems to have little moral grounds to convince their subordinates, hence weakness of the command-and-control chain within the sector. Spirit of national unity, loyalty to civilian rule and professionalism as a unifying slogan remain a challenge and deficient. The Top leadership seem more inclined to political affiliation rather than professional.

Economy

1. Despite being an oil-producing nation, South Sudan's economy remains weak and to a large extent continues to be so. The oil revenue barely translates into services to the nation, economic stability or common good. Presale of crude oil is perceived as a move to bring stability. However, as is the case, not much has actually translated into economic stability nor services to the people.
2. Despite being the major source of revenue to the country and financing over 80% of the national budget, the petroleum sector remains mainly opaque with public largely shut out of information regarding the petroleum industry in the country. Even interventions and talks regarding environmental impact on the local communities still remains unknown and weighty. Many have been asking the question; "Is oil a blessing or a curse to the nation?"
3. The national debt burden is unclear! Borrowing from international monetary institutions such as IMF and World Bank may be perceived as an attempt to stabilize the economy but in the long run, this require formidable systems or else risk benefiting individuals and sink the country into debt and economic meltdown.
4. The "free market economic policy" adopted by South Sudan needs strong regulatory implementation mechanism. Absence of which exposes the country to exploitation and dumping. To a larger extent this rendered many nationally owned businesses, professionals and consumer vulnerable. "The country indeed seems a free market place"

Domestic Policy

1. The country does seem to struggle with the task of defining clear domestic policy to inform national vision in terms of governance, development plan or priorities. The little efforts being made seem to depict intent to find a clear direction but not sufficient to take the country to a distinctive direction in the foreseeable future.
2. Alarmingly, most government officials equally lack full understanding of the domestic policy of the country. National policies seem to be developed independent of any distinct central objective. There is clear indication of a missing link and absence of a central vision/master plan for the country. Such gaps create uncertainties hence hindering prosperity.
3. Joining regional blocs without clear policy and plan on how to meet obligations, standards of those blocs and protect the interest of the citizens only expose the country to humiliation and further vulnerability.
4. Missed opportunities and engaging with less qualified personnel in such sensitive posts continue to frustrate development efforts and is counterproductive for the nation. Hence, often blocking skills and knowledge transfer. The country has very resourceful people but these are often sidelined and not accorded the opportunity to serve the nation.

Foreign Policy

1. Foreign relations reflect a country's outlook as it is necessary for good relations and strategic mutual cooperation. However, the general feeling is that, South Sudan's government seems not to give priority to strategic foreign relations and this has led to loss credibility, dignity and respect among Nations and strategic allies.
2. South Sudan's many embassies worldwide seem to lack sufficient human and financial resources. It is clearly overstretched to meet its demands. This has rendered some embassies ineffective. Hence compromising the quality of diplomatic service. How does the current state of diplomatic service help the country?
3. South Sudan would not have expected issues with its international boundaries since the country inherited existent international borders the country had as part of the Sudan and these were clearly marked. However, the emergence of the dispute in areas such as the Ilemi Triangle could potentially be a cause of international tension if not handled well. South Sudan can't afford to get into conflict with the neighboring states.

Planning and Strategic Thinking

1. As long as the country does not have a central national entity to spearheads planning and strategic thinking for the nation, the future story of the country remains marred with uncertainties. For steady national development, other nations often depend on a central national institute or entity that sets national development objectives and inform policy direction based on scientific research and analysis.
2. Absence of a central coordinating planning and strategy institution renders the country vulnerable to any idea that is being floated by different entities and it becomes difficult to have clear perception of the ultimate impact or benefit to the nation. This could either be trial without scientific analysis/contextualization or end up as a copy and paste.
3. The existent gaps in implementation of policies, plans and new ideas can be attributed to inadequate national coordination in thinking and planning. This may also be linked to lack of good systems of governance. This could further expose the country to further turmoil and retard national development and prosperity.

Introduction

Scenario development/planning in recent times has become one of the strategic tools used by many institutions, corporations and entities in both development and private sector to probe uncertainty, forecast future prospect and to generate understanding of the operating environment necessary for progress within a specific time horizon. Scenario building is also intended to interrogate, shifting conceptual landscape in delivery of specific targets, plans and agenda with an intention of informing future planning and better analysis of the operating environment and prospects for achieving desired impact. Therefore, scenario development and planning can also be used for forecasting existing national atmosphere, ecosystem and environment for wider development. This process is intended to provide a synthesis of the specific incidences, factors and existing knowledge of trends that underpin different scenarios unfolding in the country. This helps in provision of possible recommendations for policy action.

The history and practice of scenario planning can be traced back to early 1970s when Royal Dutch/Shell planning group employed it as a tool for long-range corporate planning.¹ As consultants and organizations have come to recognize the value of scenarios development and planning, they have also latched onto one scenario technique. Despite an increasing interest among practitioners to carry out scenarios' development and planning, it is important to understand that this is a time and resource intensive process. Most common challenges to avoid in scenarios development is planning paralysis due to multitude of possibilities and uncertainties that may arise. It has become increasingly necessary for organizations not only to make flexible long-term plans but also to understand their fast-changing operating environment, similarly nations and governments. Scenario planning provides real-time insight into the future. Synthesizing some disparate conceptualizations of what constitutes scenario planning.² This is an important aspect of the entire process, which requires a step-by-step planning.

¹https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287774424_Scenario_planning_Methodologies_methods_and_shifting_conceptual_landscape

² Chermack, Van der Merwe and Lynham (2007, p.381)

In 2009, IKV Pax Christi (not PAX, the working organization of PAX Christi Netherlands and the Inter Church Council) and Cordaid commissioned the development of scenarios for the future of Sudan in 2012. These scenarios described many mechanisms that determined how events have since unfolded to include warning that independent South Sudan, without northern Sudan as a common and unifying enemy, ran the risk of major fragmentation and civil war; and that South-South dialogue was essential for stable peaceful South Sudan. In 2016, PAX and Concern Citizens Network for Peace (CCNP) commissioned a follow-up scenario process, aimed at contributing to the discourse on the future of South Sudan, the result of which is “South Sudan Scenarios in 2020”

Planning and development of Scenarios for the future of South Sudan continue to be relevant for the following reasons:

1. In order to prepare for what lies ahead, it is helpful to collect thoughts on possible long-term developments by identifying various potential scenarios, uncertainties and the possible contributing factors;
2. Scenarios planning and development stimulates open debate about the future of the entity in this case South Sudan. This allows a more structured way to discuss what future developments may mean, how these should be addressed, who are the influencing actors/factors in a particular situation.
3. Such an exercise may assist policy planning by providing pointers for various policy trajectories. Planning for several/different scenarios increases national organizational, institutional or national strategic responsiveness.

In order to contribute to these purposes, scenarios identified need to be both creative and conceivable with clear linkages to past event or current developments. They should be internally consistent and thought provoking. This document is not intended to condemn South Sudan to a specific scenario but rather provide a picture of possible trajectories the country may follow depending on certain developments bases on the assessment of South Sudanese and non-South Sudanese consulted in the process of stakeholder and actors' consultation.

The future may not look exactly like any of the scenarios described in this report, but is likely to include some features from some or all of the scenarios described in this document. The scenarios are intended to provide a comprehensive view and options for a brighter future. It shows the need for South Sudanese political leadership and all actors involve such as civil society, academia, faith-based institutions, international development and humanitarian agencies to make specific choices to safeguard the future of the country from total collapse. It is to provide advice on what uncertainty could be facing the country and prepared for different futures situations that may arise. Hence, stimulating debate on how to move forward and capitalize on progressive factors to achieve the most suitable scenarios for South Sudan.

Rationale

South Sudan is on the path for systems and institution reform and transformation. The signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018.³ The reform and transformation initiatives outlined in R-ARCSS present an opportunity. Actual implementation of R-ARCSS seems slow and shaky. It appears that the parties to the agreement may have lost steam and have slowed down on several aspects of implementation. The commitment and enthusiasm exhibited at the negotiation table seems lost and Optimisms is diminishing among ordinary citizens.

Actions of the parties seem not to encourage optimism among the public, rendering the future prospects for peace and stability elusive. Therefore, CCNP opted to undertake scenario planning with intention to provide pointers and recommendations to possible policy trajectory, which will help policy makers and different actors to choose the path for possible best situation despite several challenges and uncertainties. The justification for developing this document and the policy recommendations provided are to offer options to facilitate possible shift to placing the country on the path for peace and stability.

Methodology

When identifying uncertainties, it is important to have a constant reality check to draw correlation and identify similarities between different uncertainties to avoid stagnation and facilitate summary and simplification of particular aspect of the uncertainties. Keep focused on the core issues and build consensus on different agreed upon scenarios. Common mistake to avoid is the believe that only one particular scenario is important and build strategies or recommendations around that scenario. Scenario planning is dealing with all possible outcomes to develop a strategy or recommendations that will stand the test of all scenarios.

When engaging in scenario planning, without firstly orienting the team with an examination of the present and how it has come to be, our consideration of the future becomes rudderless.⁴ Therefore it is important to take a moment of reflection and jog memories of the past and present to provide basis for precise forecasting. Note, scenario development and planning are not claiming to provide accurate prediction of the future but rather highlight possibilities and uncertainties. Mapping the time horizon is an integral aspect of scenario planning. Therefore, looking at short, medium and long-term factors is essential.

³ Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) 2018

⁴ https://pureportal.strath.ac.uk/files-asset/46249908/Bradfield_Derbyshire_Wright_F2016_the_critical_role_of_history_in_scenario_thinking.pdf

The scenarios in this document have been built using multiple approaches and involvement of individuals and groups from different sectors including individuals working in the government, as well as international agencies. The data gathered to build the scenarios is based on desktop research, structured conversations/interviews with opinion leaders and opinion shapers from different sectors of the South Sudanese societies followed by multi-day scenario analysis workshops and several brain storming sessions held by members of the Concern Citizens Network for Peace (CCNP). The opinion leaders consulted range from current and former members of parliament, persons who participated in the liberations struggle and served in the previous governments, current political leaders, civil society activists, youth leaders, women leaders, members from the academia and South Sudanese involved in humanitarian/development work in the country.

Representatives from international community and friends of South Sudan within the diplomatic corps did share their insights based on request. An android-based data collection tool known as Open Data Kit (ODK) was used to facilitate data collection from different state capitals out of Juba. Subsequently, the draft scenarios were further tested and strengthened by reviewers, during a validation workshop of CCNP members and by other South Sudanese and friends of South Sudan out of the country. The scenarios in this document were created through a three-phased approach using a six steps process.

Phase one: Setting the time horizon; This was done based on the need to give ample time for specific developments to be realized or to reach conclusion that certain trends have taken longer than realistically it could take. Therefore, the need to accept failure of particular approach, adopt new strategies and possibly bring in new actors/factors. The time span of five (5) years from 2021 to 2025 is chosen to provide ample time for necessary policy actions to be taken, allow for monitoring, evaluation and potential policy adjustment where necessary.

Phase two: Identification of trends that are likely to happen or remain for the entire time horizon “probabilities” and “uncertainties”. While the uncertainties determine the differences between each of the scenarios, the probabilities may determine commonalities. The uncertainties and probabilities are vital in development of scenario. This help to minimize wrong assumptions and bias that may lead to develop unrealistic scenarios.

Phase three: Further interrogation of the key uncertainties that form the basis for each scenario, followed by the actual designing of the scenarios. This is a critical step, which allows for distillation and interrogation of each perceived uncertainty per each scenario. The merit of this approach is the involvement of different actors from different level. Each subsequent step provides opportunity to validate or criticize assumptions made at previous step. Therefore, CCNP process for developing Scenario for South Sudan, 2025 took the following steps.

Steps One: Setting strategic agenda and the time horizon, developing assumptions, strategic thinking and visioning. This step is characterized by reflection on historical context for a similar period of the agreed time horizon.

Step Two: Challenging the existing assumptions by questioning current models and perception about the operating environment, identification and documentation of alternative opinions, and suggestions. At this step, actors' analysis is crucial for constructing the bigger picture.

Step Three: Systematic examination of the environment, data collection, synthesis - Society and its structure; demographic, economic, political factors and public opinions, access to technology and innovation, existing capacities and geopolitical factors. One-on-one interviews and focus group discussions with opinion leaders and experts in various fields form an integral aspect of this step.

Step Four: Synthesis of information about possible future trends or events into story lines. Build consensus on areas of concern (uncertainties and possibilities) and developing the actual scenarios based on factors identified during previous three steps while finding the strength and weakness in the current model so as to generate logical policy recommendations.

Step Five: Development of narratives/story lines (Scenarios), the uncertainties, possibilities and making relevant/compelling recommendations to decision makers and actors. This is done following a systematic procedure to achieve a balance between wild creativity, imagination and thinking of possible factors that could potentially affect the scenarios. Important questions such as; what will be required? Will it be easily available? What will be the views of the public and private the actors? What will be the role of advancement and technology? What will be the approach and response of the government?


Step Six: Testing scenarios validation and approval for dissemination and use of the scenarios and the recommendations to help decision makers review, and reconsider their strategies.

Important Uncertainties

1. Will the holdout groups and R-TGoNU sign an agreement? When is the St. Egidio mediated negotiations process likely to conclude?
2. Do the South Sudanese political leaders genuinely need peace or position?
3. When R-ARCSS elapse, what next? Is the current legislature and executive ready to facilitate the anticipated reforms? Do they hold the necessary institutional capacity and capabilities? Will elections be held by 2023?
4. Will the political system and political elite respect will of the people?
5. Will citizens have the capacity and courage to demand for social accountability?
6. Where are the South Sudan's long-time friends? Will they be willing to rekindle the relationship?
7. Can a country effectively engage and maintain diplomatic relationship without written foreign policy and plan?
8. Will ordinary citizens in South Sudan benefit from the country joining regional, continental and international organizations?
9. Who is supposed to develop national policy and direct engagement of the government to respond to priorities of ordinary citizens? Which office should be responsible to provide leadership for such responsibility?
10. Is South Sudan government ready to implement comprehensive responsive security sector as well the economic reforms?
11. What is the national security and economic interest of South Sudan, and how does that fit in regional and international relations?

The scenarios

The four (4) Scenarios suggested and described in this document were developed based on assessment of general situation in the country and most likely situation that may realistically be envisioned. The description predominantly depends on key important uncertainties identified during consultations with different stakeholders and concern citizens. However, it is important to note that analysis of other intrinsic factors in the country were used as basis to arrive at each scenario mentioned below. At least the hypothesis and possibilities of two or three key uncertainties have to be justified so as to reach a particular scenario. The scenarios outlined in this document are an indication of what could possibly happen given specific combination of key and important uncertainties. But not necessarily in a particular order. Therefore, the scenarios are not static but rather dynamic description or projection of possible conundrum in specific time horizon. Based on the fast-evolving context in the country, a pointer to policy trajectory under a particular theme can be applied to more than one scenario at a particular time as policy lessons for a particular scenario to inform future mitigation measures that may require a multifaceted approach.



Scenario One: Best-Case Scenario

Characterized by a peaceful country that has implemented all the reforms and transformation programs outlined in R-ARCSS, registering success in implementing major national development projects. Negotiations with the holdout groups under the mediation efforts of St. Egidio, leads to signing of a truce with the holdout groups joining national governance. Systems established to facilitate good governance – transparency and accountability, inclusion, equity and equality embraced, tribalism, regionalism, clannism and nepotism addressed. National priorities aligned to the needs and aspirations of the citizens other than elite focused. Politically instigated inter and intra communal violence reduced, social services and other sovereign roles played by the state including provision of security to all. The country leadership provides clear vision for national development, peace and stability where the citizens realize dividend of independency and culture of consensus and political will to pull the country out of under development is embraced.

Future history

After a difficult negotiation process during the High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) between 2017 and 2018, South Sudanese political parties and other stakeholders signed the Revitalize Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. This agreement formed the basis for the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The agreement introduced a power sharing formula, which was intended to provide for equitable power sharing among the parties to the agreement. Genuine application of the power-sharing ratio by the parties in allocation of various government positions at different levels would provide for stability and building confidence among the parties. This power-sharing ratio was arrived at to facilitate the implementation of the responsibility sharing during the transitional period so as to avoid conflict. The agreement in article 1.9 introduced a section on the need for collegiality and consensus build in exercise of certain powers. This article was envisaged to introduce balance in exercise and usage of power among different parties at the presidency.

The R-ARCSS 2018 introduced key reform and transformation programs which remains as a core themes of the agreement. While chapter one predominantly focuses on power sharing, chapter two of R-ARCSS embedded an instrument of cessation of hostilities, which predominantly focuses on security arrangement during the transitional period and the security sector reform and transformation. This is perceived as an important means to restore security, provide peaceful cohesion, stability and development in the country during the transitional period. Implementation of chapter two in letter and spirit would translate to seeing the country at a point where outbreak of violent conflict involving political groups would not be an immediate threat to peace and stability. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), envisioned several important processes such as; comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) that would be anchored on the work of Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) Board. A body comprising of high-ranking personnel with vast experience in the security sector plus non-political stakeholders signatory to the R-ARCSS.

The drafters of the Agreement seem cognizant of the dire humanitarian situation in the country, which caused massive displacement and humanitarian crisis, the need to institute deliberate economic reforms, importance of establishing transitional justice mechanisms, judicial reforms and constitution making process. The humanitarian response provided for in chapter three is envisaged to facilitate free and voluntary return, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and easy access to humanitarian actors by removing the unnecessary road blocks that has emerged in the country over the years as to facilitate smooth delivery of emergency humanitarian responses. Chapter four of the agreement outlined several pieces of legislations to be reviewed and new institutions to be established so as to facilitate envisioned economic reforms anticipated during transitional period and beyond are actually reviewed and acted upon by parliament. Chapter four of R-ARCSS forecasts several reforms in resource and economic management to realize economic stability and growth in the country.



Transitional justice in post conflict context is often perceived as an important process that attempts to provide closure for atrocities experienced by communities and different groups in the society. This often seeks to provide a new beginning however, this process is often difficult to start and political actors are skeptical about the possible wave of the process that demanding accountability. The drafters of chapter five of the agreement clearly envisioned a process that would apply multiple approach - restorative justice through the Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA), Truth, Healing and Reconciliation Commission (THRC) but also the possibility of realizing accountability through the Hybrid Court that would be established with the support of the R-TGONU and the African Union (AU). This would help the country to heal from the wounds of the violent conflict experienced in the recent history of the country.

The future of South Sudan at the point when the parties agreed to sign R-ARCSS was perceived to be based on a new constitutional order as provided for in chapter six. The significance of the constitution making process is to give South Sudanese the opportunity to participate in the design, development and promulgation of a constitution that many be referred to as the “Permanent Constitution” This is expected to be a people led and people centered process that captures and reflects the views and aspirations of all South Sudanese. The country was expected to make necessary efforts to implement the reform and transformations agenda and initiate changes with the signing of R-ARCSS.

However, this required sufficient political good will so as to usher the country into conduct of a national elections at the end of the transitional period. Elections and constitution making worldwide are known to be resource intensive processes. Therefore, South Sudan would require both technical and financial support from international agencies like United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and other international agencies. The involvement of international development agencies and the Civil Society Organizations are indispensable and often necessary to ensure that the processes pay attention to fulfilling the aspirations of the ordinary citizens. People’s participation in such processes not only serves as measures of credibility but also bring the people close to national governance processes. This includes processes instituted to implement responsible resource utilization e.g. Public Finance Management Reform Process (PFM-RP).

The situation in 2025

Permanent Constitution developed through a people led and people owned process, which included the voices and aspirations of all sectors of the society. The country has an instrument of governance and a social contract between the people and those entrusted to govern the country. Members of parliament elected through a nationwide multiparty election and strong opposition in place to balance the governance discourse and enhance democratic and rights based governance. Each constituency represented by their elected Member of Parliament and their concerns raised by their representative to inform national priorities. All the three arms of government—Legislature, Executive and Judiciary playing their roles effectively without interference. Appointment to executive positions is done on merit and through a transparent process that involves public vetting. The country reclaims lost diplomatic ties and South Sudan regains trust of former friends.

The army is organized with professional status. Security Sector Reform (SSR) strategies developed by SDSR Board is fully implemented, South Sudan Army participating in international peacekeeping operations around the world. The institution of the army and all security sector institutions submit to civilian rule with strong command and control chain, demonstrate patriotism, pledge loyalty to the nation and the constitution, effectively defends the territory of the Republic of South Sudan. Civilians in all parts of the country feel secure and their property protected. Other law enforcement agencies, such as Police and Prison are fully transformed into services and indeed respect human rights and civilians trust them and appreciate their services. National security focuses on issues that pose threat to the nation without favor. Mandate of all law enforcement agencies are clearly outlined and implemented in accordance with the constitution and different pieces of legislation that provides for their existence.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) return to their homeland, peacefully to settle back in their home or land with the state providing them with security. Social services and national development programmes ongoing in all parts of the country to safeguard the livelihood of all citizens. South Sudanese children get quality education, citizens needs and priorities addressed in national budget and credit facilities and loans taken from multilateral companies such as IMF used to finance major national development programs such as infrastructure. National resources well-utilized, public finances and management of national resources including petroleum revenue are achieved managed in a transparent and credible manner. All revenue collected, translates into services to the people. Conducive environment is created for establishing micro and macro-economic projects in the country.

Youth employment and development forms part of national priority. The South Sudan national currency appreciates and the national economy strengthened. Civil liberties and freedoms and constitutional rights enjoyed by all without fear or favor. Accountability and all public institutions fully supported and national budgets passed timely and annually. Transitional justice mechanisms established, financially facilitated and provisions of chapter five of R-ARCSS fully implemented. Peaceful cohesion restored in the country and communities live side-by-side whilst they work to resolve inter and intra ethnic/communal conflict in an amicable manner.



Reparation and compensation received by communities and individuals who were affected by the conflict and those directly implicated and held accountable for human rights violations and the atrocities they committed either by commission or omission are held accountable. Communities develop and share common amenities without discrimination based on ethnic affiliation, socio-cultural or political status. Trust is built among communities and South Sudanese from all parts of the country see themselves not as representatives of their ethnic groups but as citizens of one nation - South Sudan. International agencies and development partners offer technical support and genuinely participate in skills transfer programs to strength national institutional capacity and human development programs that are necessary to facilitate national economic growth and create market for local commodities.

Policy Lessons for the Best-Case Scenario

Ensure sufficient political-will for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS in letter and spirit

1. The leadership of the main parties ought to consider reconciliation and trust building among themselves to form a credible and formidable governing team, which is much needed by the country. Based on opinion and observations of leaders from different sectors, it is evident that the legacy of previous conflicts within the SPLM dating back to 1991, 2004, 2008, 2013, 2016 continue to haunt the political leadership in South Sudan. A healing and reconciliation process designed to facilitate forgiveness among the top political leaders of the country will go a long way to cultivate necessary political will to implement R-ARCSS.
2. Facilitated adequate engagement of communities and national structures other than the executive and legislature in translating the reforms anticipated into their daily operations. Three years since the signing of the R-ARCSS, the agreement has remained predominantly an elite document that has not been effectively embedded into the peace dialogue at community levels. There is need to build synergies among different sectors, enhance engagement with communities and other civic actors in creating the link between R-ARCSS and community level peace dialogue.
3. Considering the nature of R-ARCSS, there is need to have parallel structures that are designed to quickly interpret and undertake the reform agenda into the security, humanitarian, economic sectors. This should apply to other aspects of the implementation of R-ARCSS.
4. The country needs to take advantage of the arms embargo to comprehensively disarm and change the armament scheme in order to facilitate successful civilian disarmament, instill discipline in the organized forces, and organize the ranks and files.

Thinking beyond implementation of R-ARCSS

1. The country needs a constitutionally mandated Think-Tank or central institution that has clear mandate, vision, mission and objectives to conduct national research, analysis, forecasting and planning with an aim to inform national policy directions. This should comprise of intellectuals (best brains) in the country and recruit people with demonstrated track record not to exhibit tribalistic, partisan tendencies or advance personal interest. Making national decisions require use of scientific data backed up by thorough analysis. Such entity be guided by set of principles to maintain its integrity.
2. For South Sudan to realize change and positive growth, there has to be demand from the people. But this will requires continued and deliberate engagement with the people, and clear programs to accompany the engagement. Moving forward, South Sudan needs to develop a clear vision and mission that is all encompassing and the leaders of the country to provide the necessary leadership for realization of this vision.
3. The country requires deliberate focus on comprehensive legislative reforms and public services restructuring to facilitate the anticipated systems and institutional reforms and transformation as outlined by the R-ARCSS. This may include determination of the required size of public service and implement downsizing policy.



Scenario Two: Status Quo

Many uncertainties, selective implementation of R-ARCSS, latent friction among the parties with top leadership seemingly working in collaboration and ostensibly trying to implement the reform and transformation agenda of the R-ARCSS. However, this is done according to their own vision. Institutions of the executive distributed according to the responsibility sharing formula provided for in the R-ARCSS with seemingly blurry lines of inter-agency cooperation. Distinct party division/affiliation seen evident in the entire outlook of the executive. Progress in each institution predominantly depends on vision of the head of the institution. Most importantly how proactive and strategically the head of the institution position themselves and their institution/agency within the executive to be considered as part of the priority.

Slight efforts being made to put up with the quest for aligning state priorities to citizen's needs/priorities, fear and intimidation seem prevalent among civilians and other government officials. The center seems to be shrinking and focusing more on national affairs and impact on the periphery diminishing – basic services and protection of civilians. Judiciary and Legislature seem less prominent with executive overlapping their role. National economy seems stagnant and unstable and continues to be weakened. Tribalism and conflict over resources, inter and intra-communal conflict continue to engulf the country. Holdout groups and insecurity still continue to pose threat to the nation while citizens remain disillusioned.

A future history

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) negotiated with the participation of stakeholders is indeed perceived as an instrument for facilitating a shared governance arrangement among the parties. This agreement formed the basis for the establishment of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU). The power-sharing formula introduced by R-ARCSS, was intended to provide for equitable power sharing among the parties with the hope of achieving political stability and creating room for reform, transformation and preparation for legitimate democratization process by facilitating a constitution making through a people led and people driven process before finally conducting a national elections that will give the people of South Sudan an opportunity to elect their leaders.



The power-sharing formula has largely been applied in some aspect of the R-ARCSS implementation, while in some cases its application seems challenged. Responsibility sharing during the Transitional period is dependent on the proposed power-sharing ratio or a collegial arrangement as proposed in article 1.9 of R-ARCSS. The assumption is that the parties to R-ARCSS will implement the peace agreement as a team and eventually lead towards realization of the stipulated reforms. However, key processes such as formation of the executive could not be realized in time and the establishment of the full Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) took more than expected. Reconstitution of parliament was accomplished almost three years after signing of R-ARCSS.

The proposed reform and transformation agenda remains core to the implementation of R-ARCSS. The parties to the agreement also echo this while in actual implementation focus seems to be mainly on power sharing other than meticulous implementation of the reform agenda. The subsequent chapters of the agreement seem to have attracted less attention from the parties and if any, its implementation is done selectively. Security arrangements have largely been lagging behind schedule and seem ignored in some instances. Soldiers assembled in the cantonment areas and eventually to the training centers but this process has not been concluded as anticipated. Graduation of the forces, which was envisioned, as a pre-transitional task has not been realized as stipulated until the transition period is almost coming to an end.

Critical elements of Security Sector Reform (SSR) still remain unaccomplished; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process remains unclear. Attempts were made to rollout DDR in some parts of the country but this did not produce a desirable result hence, was aborted. R-ARCSS envisioned review of several pieces of legislation to facilitate the reform and transformation agenda and this included the five security laws namely SPLA Act 2009 South Sudan National Police Service Act 2009, National Security Act 2014, South Sudan Prison Service Act 2011 and the Fire brigade/Civil Defense Bill. The work of Strategic Defense and Security Sector Review (SDSR) Board would help to provide a comprehensive roadmap to SSR in the country. All these processes are essential to reorganization and professionalization of the security sector in South Sudan. However, all seem to be stuck and remain incomplete.



The humanitarian situation in the country continues to worsen. The already dire situation of IDPs and refugees has further been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and adverse effect of climate change such as flood and dry spell coupled with continued insecurity in some parts of the country. The ordinary citizens still remain largely insecure. Important processes such as economic reform, transitional justice and constitution making remain at nascent stages. The only evidence of the economic reform is seen with the formation of the Public Finance Management Reform architecture. However; this is yet to register major and concrete success for economic growth and stability.

Other critical institutions necessary for economic reform attempt to make efforts but this seems frustrated due to deficiency of political will from the top leadership. The executive has adopted the tendency of borrowing and accepting loans offered by multilateral companies, without involvement of parliament. Circumstances and conditions for these loan facilities remain largely unknown to the public. South Sudan's petroleum industry remains one of the most opaque sectors, public and most government official seems not to know the exact amount of revenue the country has received and how it's utilized.

Parliament has a critical role in realization of the anticipated reform and transformation process in the country. Several pieces of legislation reviewed by National Constitution Amendment Committee (NCAC) await enactment by parliament including development of other critical pieces of legislation including one that would govern the constitution making process, which is already behind schedule, review the Elections Act 2012 and those required for the establishment of new institutions. However, the August House seem to experience several challenges that range from stalled renovation of the chamber

forcing the parliament to conduct sitting in a rented commercial hall, the big number of 550 members of which many are oblivious of their role as Members of Parliament (MP). Some of the MPs have never read and remain oblivious to the contents of the R-ARCSS. These individuals, have no idea of the magnitude of work that they supposed to carry out during the transitional period. Amidst these challenges that members of the August House are faced with, law literacy level among some of its members poses further threat to effectiveness of the current parliament.

Overall, service delivery to the ordinary citizens still remains a far-fetched dream. The grassroots are largely forgotten, the government mainly focusing on the capital and welfare of the top government officials, whilst the periphery is left under the care of humanitarian partners. The international and national humanitarian agencies and civil society organizations are shouldering the responsibility of service delivery to the ordinary citizens. National priorities hardly include investment in education, health services and basic infrastructure. Therefore, access to basic services such as health care or clean water remain far from reach of most South Sudanese.

The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) is particularly bloated and the assumption was that these institutions would ease service delivery to the people however, the institutions have largely remained in name and at the capital. Tribalism and institutional weakness continue to trouble national institutions. The civil society and national non-governmental organizations have emerged as the alternative channel to amplify the voice and concerns of the ordinary citizens. Majority of the people at the grass roots have more confidence in the NGOs because these are the entities that can listen to their concerns and possibly intervene.

The situation in 2025

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) expire and R-TGONU continues to run the country without necessarily seeking further mandate and/or their mandate extend through an act of parliament. The power-sharing formula introduced by the R-ARCSS abrogated, opposition groups immensely weakened and the party lines blurred. The collegial nature of presidency diminishes; agenda of the council of ministers set by a group of individuals and based on their relations with the presidency lack of clarity as to who is opposition and who is the main governing party.

Intimidation and restrictions of freedoms of expression, speech, assembly, association continued and the civic space further shrinking. The anticipated reforms and important processes such as constitution making and preparation for elections, transitional justice processes financially staved and eventual collapse and forsaken. However, based on international pressure and in the quest for legitimacy, an election is announced. Only those who have the money and favored candidates of the main governing party leadership participate in the elections and the election is conducted without proper preparations and the credibility of the process is questioned by both locally and international.

The governance system is more centralized; talk of federalization remains on paper, the better system of governance that people of South Sudan have been looking forward for remains a dream. The country leadership is not willing to acknowledging their mistakes, dialogue among conflicting communities or parties are in low and engagement within those in the government remains minimal.

The Public service politicized, and even junior officers appointed by presidential decrees. Tribalism is rampant and used to achieve self-interest of political elites. and institutions of governance continue to be weakened. Accountability mechanisms such as the Audit Chamber, Anti-Corruption Commission among others crippled through financial starvation. Parliament never holds a credible debate; members remain loyal to the appointing authority and care less about the constituencies they are supposed to represent. Members spend more time on witch-hunting, fighting each other and forming alliances to maintain their seats, instead of working for the national interest. Majority of MPs seem not to understand or care about the important of their role in nation building. Hence the passage of laws becomes such a slow process without critical analysis and the executive branch of the government seemingly running the country alone without proper oversight role of the legislature.



The soldiers in cantonment area and training centers get tired as they waiting for graduation and due to lack of basic supplies such as food and sanitation materials/facilities. Many decide to desert training and cantonment centers. The idea of professional and unified army lost or the personnel graduated anyway but not fully unified (a weak and fragmented force). Each

group silently remains with their own perception and passive division. DDR process largely not accepted by many ex-combatants and illicit arms continue to proliferate among civilian population.

Insecurity heightened in the country, cases of armed robbery using sophisticated weapons initially procured by state for elite security organs in both urban and rural areas. The R-ARCSS proposed roadmap for security sector reform and transformation and the work of SDSR Board shelved and the concept of national security shrinks to only protecting the VIP and installations in the capital, few selected areas in the country and exclude protection of the territorial integrity, borders and protecting civilians. The army further loses dignity and respect from the civilian population and are not even able to sustain live. Human rights violations increase and impunity becomes order of the day.

The humanitarian situation in the country continues to worsen. The already dire situation of IDPs and refugees further exacerbated and adverse effect of climate change such as flood and dry spell coupled threatening livelihood and no solutions provided. The ordinary citizens still remain largely insecure. The Public Finance Management Reform and other reform processes ends up used as a way of convincing the multilaterals and the international community to believe that reform is possible but actually have little impact. Oil and non-oil revenue plus other natural resources such as timber, gold, gum Arabic and land continue to be sold under unclear circumstances for enriching individuals who seem well connected and have already build wealth out of national resources.

National economy continues to weaken, life continues to be difficult for the ordinary citizens and the public servants' salaries continue to delay for many months. Executive adopt the tendency of borrowing and accepting loans offered by multilateral companies without involvement of parliament and the country sinks deeper in debt. Circumstances and conditions for these borrowings remain largely unknown to the public.

Overall, service delivery to the ordinary citizens remains a far-fetched dream with the humanitarian priority shifting to other parts of the world. The grassroots are largely forgotten and citizens pushed to the periphery especially those in boarder areas seek services from the neighboring states and actually benefit from social services in the border town. Neighboring countries slowly encroach on South Sudan land and the citizens at the periphery identify with those nations. Children learn cultures and curriculum from those countries. The international and national humanitarian agencies and civil society organizations suffer donor fatigue.

Education, health and basic infrastructure crumble. All government officials and few individual citizens who can afford take their children to schools in the neighboring countries travel out of the country when they need health services. The Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU) slowly gets defeated to sustain the bloated government and salaries are paid intermittently with incidents of public servants accumulating salary arrears for over one year. Tribalism and institutional weakness continue and become more prominent. The civic space further shrinks, national non-governmental organizations unable to deliver much needed humanitarian aid to people out of the capital and more people in the capital are vulnerable and wishes to benefit from the humanitarian aid as well. Level of frustration among the citizens keeps rising and the youth becoming uncontrollable and frustrated.

Policy Lessons for the Status Quo

Ensure sufficient political-will for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS

1. The existence of R-ARCSS is an opportunity. Its expiry without major accomplishment poses many uncertainties for the country. The anticipated reform and transformation agenda e.g., unification of the forces would accord the country yet another opportunity to realize necessary reform in the security sector. However, mishandling this might haunt the country for a while and hopefully the political leaders don't use this to facilitate another violent conflict in the country, as was the case in 2013 and 2016.
2. The legislature has a critical role during the transition period, despite the evident challenges. It is therefore, important to strategically engage and enhance capacity of key MPs and build a critical mass of those who have the potential to direct the discourse in the house and legislate in a manner that is responsive to the vulnerability of the country.
3. There is a persistent view that hostility at community levels is sometimes instigated by few political elites from the center. Therefore, it is important to empower the community to dissociate from the barbaric acts and choose modernity through national awareness programs.
4. Insecurity and proliferation of illicit weapons in South Sudan can partially be attributed to the legacy of the liberation struggle, ill handled DDR process after CPA 2005 and mismanagement of armament system. The semi-autonomous government of Southern Sudan was hesitant to conduct a nationwide disarmament hence entrenching the culture of civilians using arms for communal activities such as hunting, guarding cattle and cattle wrestling. Though there are other inherent contributing factors to the ongoing insecurity in the country. A comprehensive DDR process in South Sudan will require creativity and contextualization.

Thinking beyond implementation of R-ARCSS

1. Nations without plan risks collapse and easily sliding into turmoil. A comprehensive national plan based on e.g., nationwide assessment of vulnerability, potential threats, opportunities and understanding of past realities often help to inform plans for security, development, social service delivery and even diplomatic relations. This will then be aggregated into a statement vital and less vital concern and be used to inform legislative and policy development.

2. Thinking and planning for a nation is not only an event or a process that may or may not be facilitated and worst of all abandoned halfway. Such is a process that other nations consider as “heart of the nation” and an institution established for the sole purpose of undertaking scientific research, analysis and planning to inform or test nations policies and forecast national trajectory to advise domestic and foreign policy. Acknowledging this is a sovereign responsibility begs the big question! Who thinks and plans for South Sudan?

3. In order to realize state viability, an effective and efficient public service is an important element. Reorganizing the public service to manageable and efficient size, investment in building institutions and systems, strengthening inter-agency relationship by provision of clear regulations to shape national governance and shift the focus away from self-reward to provision of necessary leadership for delivery of common good may be an option to consider.



Scenario Three: Dictatorship

Selective or aborted implementation of the reform and transformation agenda initiated by R-ARCSS, parliament unable to provide space for members to equally and freely participate and play the oversight role, free speech, freedom of association and other liberties curtail and inhibited. More repressive laws enacted. Widespread fear and intimidation used against ordinary citizens and other government officials including members of executive, legislature and judiciary. The center exercise strong grip on almost every affair of the nation but significantly shrinking influence on the periphery. Eventually, elections conducted with most political parties unable to take part, other locations due to logistical and security challenges end up not participating. The current parties to R-ARCSS fizzle out and the more dominant party buying off members from the other parties and eventually opposition voices silenced and the country remains under a single party rule.



The other groups face significant intimidation during the process and others drop the bid to participate in elections. Judiciary and legislature seem less assertive in exercising their duties. No clear plans for the country, executive arm of the government taking up role of the legislature and judiciary, foreign relations handled based on personal connections and for personal/group interest without clear strategy, territorial integrity constantly threatened by neighboring states passively encroaching South Sudan. National economy crumbling, freedoms and civil liberties prohibited. Citizens needs/aspirations do not form national priority and the citizen's left with no option but to follow what the central dictatorial authority decides.

A future history

Implementation of R-ARCSS slowly abandoned, parliament does not provide space for equal and free debate and over a period of time, their oversight role is gradually ignored and not recognized. Free speech, freedom of association and other liberties totally restricted and every aspect of life in the country is controlled by state. More repressive laws enacted without citizen participation and state security organs crack down on citizens for all kind of reasons ranging from voicing concerns over the need to provide services to the people.

Expression of any dissatisfaction against the state is perceived as opposition, which is generally not tolerated. Talk of reforms and transformation in the country is perceived as call for regime change, which is perceived as an agenda, which is instigated by external forces. Generally, the country is governed by iron fist and every decision or appointments of state officers must be done by office of the president and by the president. Public servants and constitutional post holders don't see themselves as servants of the people but rather only pledge their loyalty to the president who is the sole appointing authority.

Widespread fear and intimidation used against ordinary citizens and other government officials including members of executive, legislature and judiciary. People basically stay in those positions because it at least gives them relevance in the dictatorial state but not making much difference. Others fear to leave because they are not sure of what could be the outcome. The center exercise strong grip on every affair of the nation but significantly shrinking influence on the periphery.

Territorial integrity constantly threatened by neighboring states slowly encroaching the country's territory by offering services to parts where the central government have neglected. The citizens in such neglected areas on the periphery are left with no choice but shift their loyalty



to where they receive basic services from and those who provide the services gradually annex those parts to their territory. National economy crumbling significantly and the South Sudanese pound lose value immensely. Judiciary and legislature less assertive in exercising their duties and the country has no clear plans. Parliament does not follow a specific calendar of planned activities but rather only exist to endorse what the president has instructed and the executive arm of the government taking up role of the legislature and judiciary.



Eventually elections conducted amidst intimidation and most political parties unable to take part, with most parts of the country not participating. The dominant political party buying off most members of the other parties and eventually parties to R-ARCSS fizzled out and opposition voices silenced. The country remains under a single party rule. Every aspect of political life in the country is around the ruling party of the day and most citizens choose to stay away from party politics. Foreign relations handled based on personal connections and for personal/group interest without clear strategy.

Domestic policy is never clear to citizens and their needs/aspirations do not form national priority. Citizens left with no option but to follow what the central dictatorial authority decides. Few individuals benefit from national resources and there is constant struggle within the few political elite as to who will please the president more than the others and be given lucrative appointments. While the dictatorial center revolves around the president, it is evident that the president in this case is surrounded and being misled by a group that never gets satisfied and only works for their personal interest and to acquire wealth as much as they can.

Citizens disenfranchised, the country militarized in terms of all state affairs and life totally turned into a military state. Media freedom and civil liberty restricted. Citizens have to take permission for everything they wish to do publicly since they may not know how the state will perceive and the state has made it as a condition that permission be taken for every public event. Internet restricted and controlled when state deems necessary, human right violations go unaccounted for and in worst scenarios arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings of perceived critics of the regime go unquestioned.

The situation in 2025

Constitutional order effectively overthrown, the country is run on decrees and orders from the president and the element of checks and balance completely overlooked. Public officials are changed as the president wishes and appoint new ones at will. Some posts are left unoccupied after the occupants are removed by presidential decree or order. The country is no longer governed based on an agreed instrument of governance or social contract between the people and those they entrust to govern the country but rather the rule of individual.

Parliament suspended and recalled back at a time that the president deems necessary. Constituencies represented by those who were imposed on them through an election, which did not represent the will of the people. The imposed representatives are more or less appointees of the president and are more interested in pleasing the president and fulfilling their personal desire other than representing the interest of the people. One party dominates all the three arms of government – Legislature, Executive and Judiciary partly and their role is reduced to more or less representing the interest of the president and the few party elite.

Diplomatic relations significantly impacted and lost in some cases. The army internally divided and the agenda of professionalization and Security Sector Reform (SSR) abandoned. The country uses iron fist to govern, the army and other security organs such as National Security Service (NSS) get involved in all affairs of the nation without differentiating what is supposed to be purely civilian and what requires participation of security sector personnel. Civilians in all parts of the country feel insecure, intimidated and threatened. Other law enforcement agencies such as Police and Prison behave in a militant manner and civilians find it difficult to trust and interact with them. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are not able to return to their homeland.

No provision of social services and citizens in the country live in dire need of basic services, children receive poor quality education and in most places the education system/infrastructure collapsed. Citizen's priorities don't matter to the dictatorial regime but rather the ruling elite do what they deem appropriate and mostly to fulfill their interest and that of their close associates. National revenue (oil and non-oil) is not channeled through the central bank but rather divided among the ruling class and their close associates. Increased rate of corruption, the national economy miserably failed at micro and macro levels and the country operates without budget. The already dire situation of youth unemployment is further exacerbated. South Sudan currency depreciates to almost having no value.

Tribalism intensifies among South Sudanese and each ethnic community tends to only favor their own and lose trust. This contributes to creating fear among the communities, leading to numerous inter and intra-communal violence which makes the country more vulnerable to external factors. Because the center has lost significant control over the periphery, parts of the country that could receive services from the neighboring countries will start asking for such based on ethnic relations, religious affiliations or just because it's easier to call for help from across the border than reaching the center. Transitional justice initiatives abandoned, reparation and compensation only received by few communities and community members who the president and few political elites think are of support and individuals who were directly implicated evade accountable for human right violations and the atrocities they cause either by commission or omission during the crisis in 2013 and 2016.

Policy Lessons for Dictatorship Scenario

Ensure sufficient political-will for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS

1. It's important for parties forming R-TGONU to remember that R-ARCSS is an instrument that is designed as a compromise for all political actors involved to work in collaboration and deliver the country to a stage when democratic elections can be conducted and government be given mandate by the people.
2. Considering the state of the country and the extent to which different sectors of national governance and institutional capacity has been affected by the conflict, coupled with the logistical challenges, the first elections may not meet the expectation but ensuring that this is done together as R-TGoNU coalition is the best option for all.
3. Any party that thinks of deconstructing the other parties and intends to run national governance as a sole ruling party is doing so against the spirit and letter of R-ARCSS and is an enemy to the nation stability. This may not be an easy ride and may elicit undesired situation reaction in the country including full fledged conflict and take the country back to a period similar to December 2013 or July 2016. However, that at the moment the region is experiencing turbulence and internal conflict in member state such as Ethiopian and Sudan. Therefore, the regional bloc may not be in position to prioritize South Sudan but rather perceive any collapse of R-ARCSS as negligence from the political leaders of the country.
4. Currently R-ARCSS seems to be the only legal framework for South Sudan to call on international community to help the country in the quest for a stronger and credible governance, restoring peace and stability and implementing reform and transformation in different sectors. In an event one party chooses to abrogate R-ARCSS and take over the national governance as a single party or dictatorial rule, the region and international community may not have the same appetite to help South Sudan.

Thinking beyond implementation of R-ARCSS

1. Globally, there is more support and preference towards a democratic and legitimate governance therefore, the move towards dictatorship would be counterproductive for South Sudan and quash immediate future prospects of the country. Weakening opposition or intolerance to opposition voices and stifling civic space often reduces the countries prospect to democratization and earn the country a bad reputation and diminish economic prospects. Dictatorial regimes are often associated with human right violations, corruption and oppressions of the ordinary people. Such state often risks isolation and regression.
2. Dictatorial regime with an overt militarization of the public sector often tend to sideline academia and other sectors of the society, become intolerant to critical and innovative thinking hence regress immensely in development and only strive for self-sustainability. This in return makes life difficult for the dictators and they too become insecure of their own deeds hence risking total collapse or failure of the state. With the current complexity of South Sudan and the kind of negotiated coalition government, it is easy to develop dictatorial tendencies but will be difficult for the party that wish to emerge as the dictator to galvanize support but rather jeopardize the future of the nation.



Scenario Four: Resumption of war

Full fledge disagreement among the parties to the agreement, elections clearly not credible, other groups blocked out of participation in the national government, the army remain not united and each political groups fall back to their military grouping and declare war against the center. Civilians find themselves again in a situation where they are helpless and follow any group that they find themselves with not necessarily out of choice but rather fear. Some international humanitarian agencies evacuate the country due to insecurity.

Institutions of governance weakened, the central government shrink and only remain in the capital. Mistrust grows among actors within the central government. Tribalism, conflict over resources, inter and intra-communal conflict continue to engulf the country. Holdout groups and other emerging groups take control of other parts of the country. Neighboring states continue to encroach various territories of South Sudan and the citizens shift loyalty to them due to the fact that they provide services in those locations. The country risk possibility of becoming a dysfunctional state and lose membership in regional and international blocs.

A future history

After several attempts to ensure that South Sudan gains peace and stability through genuine implementation of R-ARCSS, which provided a fairly agreeable legal framework for R-TGONU to deliver the country to a peaceful and rather stable democratic state. The parties to R-ARCSS fail to govern the country in a coalition, which was envisaged during the negotiation period but rather spent time on propaganda and short changing each other. The arrangement of Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) in this case was not honored by the parties to the agreement and due to major disagreements, the composite parties resort to taking up arms against each other.



The power sharing formula provided for in R-ARCSS is generally disregarded and not respected by the parties. The dominant party buys members of the other parties and takes up positions initially allocated for the smaller parties. Some of the smaller parties form an alliance but still their voices in legislature, executive and judiciary continue to shrink. Frustrations grow among the parties and disagreements emerge to an extent that it becomes difficult to contain. The collegial nature of governance, which was anticipated by R-ARCSS diminishes.

Talk of the reform and transformation programs introduced by R-ARCSS is generally perceived as an opposition and against the regime. The country suffers severe insecurity to an extent that members of the smaller parties to R-ARCSS generally feel insecure in the coalition. Attention shifts from implementing reform agenda of R-ARCSS but rather self-defense and internal wrangle for positions and to benefit from share of the national cake. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), slowly begin to fail and the forces begin to attack each other. Efforts to achieve comprehensive Security Sector Reform (SSR) that would be anchored on the work of Strategic Defense and Security Sector Reform (SDSR) Board is trashed and disregarded.

The dire humanitarian situation in the country continues to worsen, massive displacement and humanitarian crisis witnessed in most parts of the country. This is further exacerbated by the floods and draught. The need to institute deliberate economic reform and the ongoing reform efforts such as the Public Finance Management (PFM) Reform frustrated and termed as having external influence. Establishment of the transitional justice mechanisms, judicial reforms and the constitution making process all aborted. Intra and inter-party disagreement continue and eventually degenerate to an open attack and institutions that are supposed to bring the parties together such as the presidency, council of ministers, ministerial clusters, and the legislature fail to meet quorum. Insubordination is widespread and eventually the country comes to almost stand still before resumption of another full-fledged war as was the case in 2013 and 2016.

The situation in 2025

After resumption of a full fledged war in the country, the regional countries are busy addressing their own internal peace and security situation and no one is paying attention to solve the problem in South Sudan. Insecurity intensifies in the country; the humanitarian situation worsens and no one pays attention to the plight of the ordinary citizens. The parties form their regional bases in different parts of the country and the civilians left with no option but to remain loyal to the group that have established a base in their homeland. Wide spread human right violations witnessed in different parts of the country and the warring parties begin to sign bilateral agreements from rebel groups from the neighboring states and others signing agreements with the governments of the neighboring states who in this case may also be having their internal challenges e.g., Ethiopian and Sudan.

These alliances with the neighboring states in most cases would be for the purposes of logistical support. However, in the case of Sudan, some of the warring groups may be bold enough to explore the option of reunification with Sudan in order to claim victory and defeat their perceived enemy. This may depend on the agenda of the particular warring party and who reaches out first to Sudan and how it's presented to Sudan. Such a move may not be easily acceptable to the citizens but the fact that the center had lost significant influence on the periphery and some of these neighboring states provide social services, the boarder communities may be a convinced about such a move. Such situation may lead to disintegration of the country and isolation by the entire international community. This may also prompt intervention by the United Nations in a more robust manner.

Policy Lessons for Resumption of War Scenario

Ensure sufficient political-will for genuine implementation of R-ARCSS

1. It is important to remember that R-ARCSS is not immune to internal conflict among the composite parties. The agreement requires continue dialogue among the parties to facilitate its implementation. However, lack of attention in handling dissatisfaction among the parties, deliberate move and propaganda to weaken the smaller parties and intimidation may lead to disintegration and collapse of R-ARCSS.
2. Parties to R-TGoNU must embrace R-ARCSS as an opportunity to restore peace and stability to the country and protect the country against eternal forces finding their ways in and causing more harm to the nation. A situation of instability and full fledge war in South Sudan manes the country is rendered vulnerable to infiltration by illicit groups that come with the intention of exploiting the country's natural resources such as gold, timber etc.

Thinking beyond implementation of R-ARCSS

1. Allowing the country to drift into a full fledge war at this time only increases the vulnerability of the nation to external encroachment and being used for illicit activities such as human trafficking, transit center for illicit drugs and smuggling minerals from other countries.
2. Currently Africa and African countries are facing several challenges and the world's attention is shifting to other regions where there is emerging crisis. South Sudan drifting into full fledge war at the moment may cost the country several years of development. Even the warring parties may not easily access logistical support. Therefore, the prospect of success or victory is limited and is not a viable path to follow. Full fledge war at this moment in South Sudan will only exacerbate the already dire situation and human suffering in the country. This may deprive South Sudan from development for many more years.
3. To avert sliding into full fledge conflict either intentional or unintentional, South Sudan need to take deliberate steps and have mitigation and early warning mechanism in place that will help propose scientifically backed proposals and policy option for the nation.

Reflections on the scenarios

The four scenarios outlined in this document paint a picture of possible trajectories that the country may follow given particular trends and uncertainties outlined in the document. However, it's important to note that each scenario is provided with policy lessons that will inform possible move from taking the country to the most undesirable situation described as **Dictatorship or Resumption of War**. The aim of this document is to inform policy makers and other actors to make informed decisions on their contribution towards peace and stability in the country. From the descriptions of the scenarios above, South Sudanese have a high stake and high responsibility to ensure future prosperity and stability of the country. Therefore, the honors are upon the political leaders to choose prosperity for the country over their personal interest or facilitate the process of taking the country into worst case – Resumption of war.


While the signing of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is highlighted as a major factor towards restoration of peace and stability in South Sudan, it's important to note that there are other processes such as the St. Egidio mediated process that intends to broker peace between R-TGoNU and the holdout groups. The success of this process will introduce slight shift in the country political dynamic especially in scenario one (Best Case) and scenario two (Status Quo). One would realize that in all the scenarios, the factors described are not static and bound to shift based on the interest and commitment of the actors. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that factors from one scenario could play into the other but this does not shift the entire scenario unless the transition from one scenario is caused by several factors from one scenario playing into the other.

Despite being an oil producing nation, South Sudan's economy remains weak and to a large extent it continues to weaken. Despite being the major source of revenue to the country and financing over 80% of the national expenses, the petroleum sector remains mainly opaque with the public largely shut out of information regarding the petroleum industry in the country. Interventions and talks regarding environmental impact on the local communities still seem less weighty. Many are asking, "Is oil a blessing or curse to the nation?" The oil revenue barely translates into services to the nation or stabilization of the economy – Common good. Presale of crude oil would be perceived as a move to bring stability. However, as is the case, not much has actually translated into economic stability nor services to the people. The national debt burden is unclear! Borrowing from international monetary institutions such as IMF and World Bank may be perceived as an attempt to stabilize the economy but in the long run, such require formidable systems or else risk only benefiting individuals and sink the country deep into debt and economic meltdown. The free market policy adopted by the country requires clear guidelines and regulatory mechanism, Absence of which only exposes the country to exploitation and dumping. To a larger extent this has rendered many nationally owned businesses, professionals and consumer vulnerable. The country indeed seems a free market place.

These scenarios in this document are developed based on an analysis of the country context in light of the five (5) key uncertainties mentioned above and other important uncertainties which are mentioned in earlier sections of this document. The scenarios should not be misunderstood as a form of condemnation of the country but rather a forecast of what the future would look like if concrete actions are not taken to redefine the future of the country. Therefore, the recommendations, policy lessons and pointers to policy trajectory that are provided are intended to enable the actors to exert more positive efforts to avert drifting into the last two scenarios if the proposed policy trajectory are implemented with due attention. It is therefore, important to keep the following five (5) key uncertainties at the back of our minds when we analyze and relate the scenarios to the country context.

1. Who thinks and plans for South Sudan and how? Would a central planning entity serve as the much-needed catalyst to synchronize development priorities to citizens' needs/aspirations and set the country on motion to development and stability?
2. Will the Holdout groups and R-TGoNU sign an agreement at the end of the St. Egidio mediated peace process in Rome considering the major setbacks the process seems to experience? Do the political leaders bother to building constituencies and relate to the masses and genuinely want peace or they are simply detaching and lobby for higher appointments for personal gains?
3. Will South Sudan hold elections by 2023, how will the elections be organized? Can the current legislature and executive facilitate the much-anticipated reforms? Political parties in the country seem to heavily revolve around individuals rather than standing as institutions; What will happen in the event any of the current party leaders happen to exit the political scene without prior notice?
4. Will South Sudanese women, youth, persons with disabilities and communities at local levels be able to demand accountability? What strictures exist among the communities to facilitate an organized demand for common good or social accountability?
5. What is the country's foreign and domestic policy? Does the country need to maintain all the current existing embassies and the sizeable workforce in the public service? What is the country's GDP and total debt burden? What is the national security objective of the country? Is South Sudan government ready to implement security sector reform?

The chart below indicates possibility of the country shifting from status quo to any of the three other scenarios. This clearly indicated the need for the current leadership of the country to decide and choose wisely. The possibility of the country drifting into resumption of war, dictatorship or bouncing back on the track for best case scenario has a lot to do with how much political will is deployed by the leadership of R-TGONU, particularly the presidency.



The above illustration indicates possible path for the country to end up in a particular scenario by 2025

Recommendations and suggestions for the South Sudanese Government and Parties

Planning and Strategic Thinking

1. To overcome the challenges in comprehensive and strategic planning for the nation and shift towards use of research and scientific analysis for policy development, there is need for the government to embrace forward thinking, smart and timely planning through a nationally established central entity (Think-Tank) comprising of national reputable intellectuals with specific mandate of conducting scientific research and contextualized analysis to inform development of responsive national plans and policy trajectory that reflect the aspirations of the people.
2. In order to establish a responsive, effective and reputable public service, South Sudan will require to undertake a nationwide assessment of the public service with an aim of diagnosing the intrinsic, systemic and institutional gaps and recommend practicable steps to be undertaken over a period of time. This may include reorganization, downsizing and targeted trainings necessary for capacity building in the public service.

Security (State and Human Security)

1. To achieve a comprehensive and responsive security sector reform and transformation, contextualized and well thought-out DDR process that included equal protection for all communities, provision of basic skills and services is a necessity. For DDR process to succeed in contexts such as South Sudan, change in armament system must be considered as a game changer. South Sudan must consider development of a Marshal Plan for the nation with help of CSOs, faith based institutions and development partners.
2. Partnership between state and the non-state actors so as to build trust and confidence of the wider population is a necessity to achieving successful DDR and responsive security sector reform. To realize full professionalization and security sector transformation there is need to rethink the training curriculum to include human rights, gender justice as a core principle and invest in recruitment of younger personnel/professionals with different skill into the security service.
3. Considering the nature of R-ARCSS, there is need to have parallel structures that will quickly interpret and undertake the reform agenda into the security sector. This process will require clear understanding of the motivating factor, reorganize the ranks, find remedy for the upheaval caused by assimilation into the army. This may include provision of startup packages for the ex-combatants or remove the motivating factors for rebellion.

Governance

1. R-TGoNU has an important role to play in providing direction in the implementation of R-ARCSS and refocusing the direction of the country towards peace, stability and prosperity. Therefore, the political leadership of R-TGoNU has an important role to play in either taking the country to the best-case scenario of into resumption of war.
2. The parliament has a critical role to play during the transition period therefore, they need to engaged in robust legislative processes necessary to facilitate the reform and transformation process in different sectors and play an oversight role in the overall national governance. Considering that the process of reconstitution took much longer, the legislature is expected to swiftly move into action or else they risk derailing the implementation of the agreement and push the country back into turmoil.
3. Tribalism in the public sector, Inter and inter-communal fights continue to disrupt smooth governance in the country and in some cases, political elite has used this to advance their political interest. Therefore, it is important for the community to steer away from this vested interest and embrace civilization and education.
4. The country need to depoliticize the public service, have competent leaders preferably elected by the communities to hold nominal posts and assigned with specific responsibility. This will discourage the excessive lobbying of leaders for favors and discourage the rebellious tendency that has developed among the communities over the years.

Foreign Policy

1. South Sudan needs to improve and master the art of diplomacy like other small but strong nations have mastered. The size and geographical location of a country may not automatically translate into strength; however, diplomatic relations and strategic choices often contribute into national strength.
2. Review the diplomatic service, only maintain embassies in selected countries for strategic purposes and appointing diplomats in countries where South Sudan has strategic interest and deploy capable and well-trained cadres (diplomats).
3. Policy makers need to define foreign policy of the country so as to determine relationship with other nations. This will enable representatives of the country in different parts of the world to speak in a coordinated manner other than express their own opinion.

Domestic Policy

1. The country needs to feel the national vision and leadership that speaks to the hearts and minds of the people. The public requires a leadership that gives message of hope, makes efforts to improve the general situation of the country and the people other than spending time only blaming the outsiders for the misfortune or failure of the country to do things right.
2. Moving forward, South Sudan need to develop a clear vision and mission that is all encompassing and the leadership of the nation to provide the necessary leadership for this vision and bold decision made to put things right at all levels.
3. South Sudan needs to strategically choose relations and allies/friends and this need to be informed by a clear analysis and understanding of the existent national capacity. Such requires firm leadership with vision at all levels to build the nation and reflect people's aspiration.
4. The current leaders may have done their best and brought the country this far but they need to ensure that the country moves forward. The young people need to be mentored to play a role and gradually shape future of the nation. There is need to focus on a nation building agenda other than implementing different policies in an uncoordinated manner.

Economy

1. Redirect the national revenue including revenue from petroleum and other natural resources such as timber, gold and gum Arabic, livestock to provide common good and strengthen the economy.
2. Allow more transparency in the oil sector, involve public and communities in the oil producing areas in making decisions on use of the allocated percent (2%) to them, assessing the environmental impact and participate in designing social cooperate benefits.
3. Parliament to exercise oversight role in national borrowing and management of total national debt burden and overseas accounts of the nation.
4. Introduce strong regulatory mechanism for the free market economic policy adopted by South Sudan to protect the nation from dumping and exploitation.
5. Fully support and implement the Public Finance Management and Reform process to realize transparency, accountability and efficiency in resource governance in the country.

Recommendations and suggestions for (inter) national civil society and the international community

Planning and Strategic Thinking

1. To overcome the challenges in comprehensive and strategic planning for the nation and shift towards use of research and scientific data for policy development, there is need for civil society, faith based institutions and development partners to encourage forward thinking, smart and timely planning by seeking to support the process of national planning and align their plans to national priorities.
2. Partner with relevant national agencies such as ministry of Public Service to undertake a nationwide assessment of the public service with an aim of diagnosing the intrinsic, systemic and institutional gaps and recommend practicable steps to be undertaken over a period of time which may include reorganization, downsizing, and targeted training necessary for skills and capacity building in the public service.

Security

1. Seek to play a more engaging and hands on role in partnership with DDR Commission and security sector institutions so as to achieve a comprehensive and responsive security sector reform and transformation, in a contextualized and well thought-out DDR process that included equal protection for all communities, provision of basic skills and provision of services as a necessity.
2. Participate in design of the DDR process and roll out a nationwide awareness programme in partnership with state agencies responsible so as to build trust and confidence of the wider population in order to achieve successful DDR and responsive security sector reform.

Governance

1. Monitor the implementation of R-ARCSS and host periodic multi-stakeholder evaluation meetings with R-TGoNU leadership to maintain focus on implementation of R-ARCSS and refocusing the direction of the country towards peace, stability and prosperity.
2. Support parliament in undertaking the critical legislative role during the transition period to facilitate reform and transformation process in different sectors and play an oversight role in the overall national governance.
3. Support awareness programme and community level peace initiatives to help communities to steer away from tribalism, inter and inter-communal and ethnical fights and embrace inclusive peace education, civilization and education.

Foreign Policy

1. Assist policy makers in defining foreign policy of the country so as to determine relationship with other nations. This will enable representatives of the country in different parts of the world to speak in a coordinated diplomatic manner other than express their personal opinion.

Domestic Policy

1. Assist in the process of awareness and develop civic education programmes designed to move the country forward and in line with the overall national vision and mission for peace and stability.
2. Offer technical support to different entities in the country to enhance the role of women and youth and ensure that the country moves forward.

Economy

1. Monitor and report on efforts to reform resource management including progress made and challenges faced by the Public Finance Management Reform process. Redirect the national revenue including petroleum and revenue from non-oil sources such as timber, gold, gum Arabic and livestock to be used for common good and for strengthening the economy.
2. Assist in ensuring more transparency in the oil sector, through involvement of public and communities in the oil producing areas in making decisions on use of the allocated two (2) percent to them, involve community structures to participate in assessing environmental impact, participate in designing possible remedies and social-cooperate benefits.
3. Support Parliament to exercise oversight role in national borrowing process, management of total national debt burden and oversea accounts of the nation in and out of the country.
4. Assist in development of strong regulatory mechanism for the free market economic policy adopted by South Sudan to protect the nation from dumping and exploitation.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the future prospects for the country will depend on efforts from all the actors and deliberate effort to choose the path to the best-case scenario for the country. The future history in each scenario is a reminder of missing opportunities while the situation in 2025 remains as a possible destination given the uncertainties outlined in this document. It is therefore, prudent to take note of the scenarios but never lose focus of policy lessons provided after each scenario.

Though the recommendations are structured in two sections, it is important to always remember the intertwined nature of nation building processes. Hence, each recommendation requires participation of all the actors and stakeholders. It's a combined effort for realization of a multifaceted approach to nation building, realization of peace, stability and development.



Photo of South Sudanese Religious and Political Leaders during a Visit to Vatican on Invitation of Pope Francis for Devine Counsel

Concern Citizens' Network for Peace (CCNP) is a platform that brings together South Sudanese citizens from different walks of life. The network was founded to provide space for intellectual and analytical discourse, brainstorming and assess of trends in the courtly for purpose of contributing to peace, development and stability. In the last years, the Concern Citizens Network for Peace with support from partners have invested in scenarios building exercise which is designed to forecast possible trends within a given time horizon. This process culminates in development of scenarios report which contains policy lessons and recommendations for different actors. The different scenarios in this document is as a result of a step by step analytical process that involved participation of South Sudanese from different walks of life and Socio-economic and political status/background